



Office for Civil Nuclear Security

Department of Trade and Industry



FINDING A BALANCE

GUIDANCE ON THE SENSITIVITY OF NUCLEAR AND RELATED INFORMATION AND ITS DISCLOSURE

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*The Office for Civil Nuclear Security
Department of Trade and Industry
B146 Harwell
Didcot
Oxon OX11 0RA*

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CONTENTS

Preface	3
Part 1	
What is the problem?	5
What can be done?	5
What is this guide for?	6
What this guide is not	6
Part 2	
How to use this guide	7
Part 3	
Guidance Tables	9
Security of Nuclear Material and Facilities	9
Information Relating to the Quantity and Form of Nuclear Material	12
Nuclear Material in Transit	12
IT Systems and Computer Systems Important to Security and Safety	13
Civil Nuclear Constabulary	14
Nuclear Material Accounting	15
Planning Applications	16
Safety Cases and Other Safety or Environmental Information	17
Contingency and Emergency Plans and Exercises	17
Personal Information	18
Radioactive Waste Inventory	19
Decommissioning	19
Historical Information	20
Threat Assessments and Security Alerting Information	20

Annex A	Legislation on Disclosure	21
Annex B	Definition of Protective Markings	25
Annex C	Categories of Nuclear Material	27
Annex D	Glossary	29

PREFACE

There are many official sources of information about civil nuclear materials and facilities. Following the terrorist acts in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, concern was expressed in various quarters about the amount of information that was so publicly and easily available to terrorists. There was increased awareness that the ease with which such information could be obtained made it easier for terrorists and others to make their plans without taking any risks. It was recognised that the benefits of a culture of openness were accompanied by risks.

There is a considerable body of legislation that requires disclosure of information for a variety of purposes. Some of these are official purposes to do with planning, environmental protection etc. Others are to do with public information and consent. The purpose of this document is to assist officials and others involved with the civil nuclear industry to manage the risks associated with compliance with their legal obligations. It is not intended in any way to water down those legal obligations only to help, if possible, lessen the ease with which those with malevolent intent can obtain the information they need.

In support of the Government's desire for transparency, this Guide carries no protective marking. It may seem paradoxical to identify publicly the types of information that could be used by terrorists. But the balance of advantage is in increasing awareness. In any case, there is nothing sensitive about, for example, stating that information about the quantities and whereabouts of plutonium is sensitive. It is the actual information that is sensitive. It may not be possible to protect the information totally but the purpose of this Guide is to help readers think about it. Is it, for example, necessary on all plans to identify a plutonium store or only on those plans used by those with an operational reason for knowing? And is it possible for these plans to be labelled as sensitive and given some protection? The answers may be negative but the issue requires thought.

A considerable amount of such information is already easily available. There is no way of recalling it. Details do, however, change. Often they change over quite short periods of time. Published information becomes unreliable if it is not regularly updated. One purpose of this guide is to begin that process. The guide, although published by the Office for Civil Nuclear Security (OCNS) as part of its remit, has been produced after widespread consultation with the industry, government departments and agencies, and the devolved administrations. It must be understood that this document provides *guidance* only. It is not a statutory instrument and has no force in law. However, further guidance should be sought from the appropriate department/authorities if a statutory requirement to release information seems at variance with this guide.

No document of this nature can be completely definitive and cases may arise where it provides little or no help. It is intended to be a dynamic document and may be amended through experience. As with any information covered by the FOI Acts and other Regulations, a decision not to disclose that is based on this guide may be open to challenge. Any such challenge will be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. OCNS believes, however, that a decision not to disclose that draws on the sensible use of this guide is more likely to be upheld.

The Ministry of Defence has a number of Guides concerning the protection of information related to the security of material used in the nuclear weapon and nuclear propulsion programmes. These programmes are outside the scope of this Guide.

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PART 1

WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?

If nuclear material were to be stolen or sabotaged, for example by terrorists, the potential consequences could be extremely grave. Nuclear material, its transport, and the processes in which it is used for civil purposes - principally power generation - need to be well protected. In the United Kingdom, a high level of security is expected at nuclear sites and there is a strict process of regulatory enforcement by the Office for Civil Nuclear Security. An important aspect of this security is the protection of information about civil nuclear material and operations and, of course, information about security measures. However, such knowledge and information is also a necessary, often essential, part of running the business. Some information may need to be available to a large number of people. Not all of these are part of the industry e.g. planners, police etc. Members of the public may also have a legitimate interest in information about nuclear facilities and operations.

The problem is how to reconcile these apparently conflicting requirements. How can information be made available to those who need it whilst keeping it from those who could take advantage of it for their own malign ends?

Few would advocate total openness of all nuclear related information. But if some knowledge is to be restricted, how do you decide what that is, to whom it should be restricted, and how do you ensure that they are able to keep it secure? Not all organisations need high levels of security for the rest of their business. When a large number of people need to know something in order to carry out their job, the knowledge is hardly a secret even though it could be misused. Neither total openness nor total security are viable options.

WHAT CAN BE DONE?

Some of the obligations about disclosure are described in Annex A. In a situation of conflicting demands and interests, a single overriding solution is unlikely to be available. In any case, situations rarely remain static. Information that is not required one day, may be required the next. Case-by-case judgments are often required. Are the risks of not disclosing something greater or less than the harm occasioned by disclosing it? Knowing why to disclose something is usually easy. But there may be little or no awareness of why it might not be such a good idea. What is needed is information about disclosure that could have adverse consequences. With that information, an informed judgment on the risks can be made. If there are risks in disclosure:

- is it in the public interest to provide access to the information?
- should it be provided only to those who can secure it?
- can the information be edited so it is less sensitive but still useful?

WHAT IS THIS GUIDE FOR?

This document describes the types of information which could be useful to terrorists and others of malign intent. It is intended as a guide, particularly to those unfamiliar with such matters, to the risks and dangers associated with automatic disclosure. It is intended to assist users in deciding whether information should be formally secured and whether to seek alternative means of achieving the same purpose.

WHAT THIS GUIDE IS NOT!

This is a *guidance* document. No obligations are implied by it and, importantly, it should not be regarded as contradicting any of the wide variety of legislation that requires certain types of information to be shared or made public. Its aim is to assist readers to be aware of, and where possible to minimise, the risks associated with those obligations.

PART 2

HOW TO USE THIS GUIDE

There should be a presumption of openness unless there are cogent and defensible reasons against it. The defensible reasons need to fit within the meaning of one of the exemptions in the Freedom of Information Act 2000. This Guide has been compiled in tabular form (Part 3) to inform decisions about which information, because of its potential value to terrorists or others with malevolent intent, should not be disclosed. It should, for example, be of assistance to those compiling safety cases and planning applications. Such documents often contain sensitive information about a nuclear facility. This Guide may assist in identifying to the safety and local government authorities those parts of the documents which they should protect and not make available to the public.

This Guide is concerned with the sensitivity of information, including that held on computer systems, relating to nuclear material, other radioactive material (ORM) and facilities housing such material. The special objective of this Guide is to prevent the disclosure of information that could assist a person or group planning theft, blackmail, sabotage and other malevolent or illegal acts. Its application is an integral part of the protection of data on nuclear material, ORM and the facilities housing such material. These data fall into the following categories:

- information on the physical security arrangements in place to protect nuclear and other radioactive material and the facilities;
- technical guidance on security standards and requirements;
- information on the quantity and type of material at a facility and its location;
- inventories, throughput, output, storage capacity of facilities and accounting;
- detail of planned movements of nuclear or other radioactive material;
- technical information about the production or processing of nuclear materials;
- information contained in facility IT systems;
- information on computer systems important to security and to safety;
- information contained in safety cases and other documents which describe facilities;
- information contained in planning applications;
- information about the deployment and operations of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC).

Official disclosure of information concerning nuclear materials, ORM and the facilities that contain such material should be considered only after this Guide has been consulted. The policy is not designed to protect commercial information, although it is recognised that, occasionally, some commercial information may contain sensitive material. Unless it conflicts with this Guide the release of such information would be at the discretion of local management.

Effective use of this Guide requires some understanding of the Protective Marking scheme used by government and the categorisation of nuclear materials.

- The *Protective Marking* scheme is a way of indicating that information should be seen only on a need-to-know basis and that it should receive appropriate protection. It is based on the damage

that could arise if the information were to be seen outside of the need-to-know group. It is not usual to attach visible labels to physical assets but the same principles can be applied. The explanations used in this Guide for not releasing information are also those that would be used to determine the appropriate Protective Marking. It is convenient, therefore, to indicate the sensitivity of particular sorts of information through the use of the national system of protective markings as this is also indicative of the security levels that are required. The definitions of the national protective markings are given in Annex B.

- Nuclear materials, including nuclear waste depending on its nature, are placed into one of four *categories*, denoted by the characters I to IV. The importance of the material and, therefore, the protection applied to counter theft or sabotage is determined by the Category into which it falls; material in Category I requires a greater level of protection than that in Category IV. Nuclear licensed sites are also given a similar category number dependent upon the material that is stored or processed there. The UK Categorisation Table is reproduced at Annex C.

PART 3

3.1 GUIDANCE TABLES

The tables in this Part provide detailed guidance to inform decisions about information that should not be released and the reasons why not. In some instances the reason for non-disclosure cites exemption given by sections of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (a cross reference to the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 is provided in Annex A). It should be understood that a malevolent act on a nuclear facility may give rise to a release of radioactivity which may be confined to the site or, worse, may affect an area surrounding the site. Information which, if disclosed, could lead to an action which could cause such a release of radioactivity would be exempt under section 38(1) of the FOI. Such information, depending on circumstances, could also be exempt under section 31(1)(g) and subsections (2)(i) and (j). Sensitive information may also be exempt under section 24(1), National Security. The term was defined by John Major, the then Prime Minister, in the House of Commons in June 1992 as "...the safeguarding of the state and community against threats to their survival or well being". These sections of the Act are implicit and, therefore not quoted in the tables. Also implicit are the provisions of regulation 12(5)(a) of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004, which provides for exception of information, the disclosure of which would affect, inter-alia, public security.

Topic	Sensitivity	Reason for Protecting
0100 Security of Nuclear Material and Facilities		
0101 Regulations and Guidance <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Nuclear Industries Security Regulations (NISR) 2003 b. Guidance to NISR 2003 c. Technical Requirements for NISR 2003 	Releasable Not Releasable Not Releasable	None This document contains procedures and operational details which would be of significant use to a person or group planning to attack a nuclear facility or transport This document contains details of standards, types of equipment to be used, procedures and security operations details of which would be of great use to a person or group planning to attack a nuclear facility for the purposes of theft or sabotage. <i>(the information contained in the document has the protective marking (P-M) of CONFIDENTIAL)</i>

Topic	Sensitivity	Reason for Protecting
<p>0102 Security Plans for Licensed Nuclear Sites</p> <p>All sites</p>	<p>Not Releasable</p>	<p>Security plans contain detailed descriptions of the security regime in place at a site and precise detail of where within the site nuclear material is stored and details of other areas vital to the site. Such information would be of great value to any person or group planning to attack a nuclear facility for the purpose of theft or sabotage. <i>(Security plans for Category I to III sites would have a P-M of CONFIDENTIAL. Those for Category IV sites have a P-M of RESTRICTED)</i></p>
<p>0103 Security Reports</p> <p>a. Reports from security surveys, inspections and assessments and other reports on the physical security or technical security measures employed on a nuclear site.</p> <p>b. Reports describing critical features and/or highlighting requirements for security improvements for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Category I & II nuclear material • Category III nuclear material • Category IV nuclear material • Vital Areas <p>c. Results of security investigations at a nuclear site, including those into leaks of sensitive information</p>	<p>Not Releasable</p> <p>All below Not Releasable</p> <p>Not Releasable</p>	<p>Access to these reports can provide persons with malevolent intent with detail on the location of nuclear materials, the measures taken to protect them and any assessed vulnerabilities there may be; thus assisting them to avoid security measures and controls. <i>(Security Reports will attract a P-M of at least CONFIDENTIAL)</i></p> <p>Information of this nature will be of great assistance to persons wishing avoid security arrangements and assist with targeting a nuclear facility. <i>(These reports merit a P-M of SECRET)</i> <i>(These reports merit a P-M of CONFIDENTIAL)</i> <i>(These reports merit a P-M of RESTRICTED)</i> <i>(These reports merit a P-M of CONFIDENTIAL)</i></p> <p>Exempt information under FOI, section 31(g) and subsections (2)(b) or (i) or (j)</p>

Topic	Sensitivity	Reason for Protecting
<p>0104 Details of construction and layout of stores and process areas, including drawings or plans held on any media, showing features of physical security relevant to the prevention of theft or sabotage at:</p> <p>a. Category I & II</p> <p>b. Vital Areas and NPS</p> <p>c. Category III</p> <p>d. Category IV</p>	<p>All Not Releasable</p>	<p>Official maps, chart or plans of sites may be released at the discretion of site management, provided they contain no description of the details of a building's functions, the materials stored therein and the location of internal security fences and the other security measures employed at the building.</p> <p>Knowledge of this nature can assist persons to avoid security arrangements and possibly assist with targeting.</p> <p><i>(Information of this nature concerning Category I & II sites, Vital Areas and Nuclear Power Stations merits a P-M of CONFIDENTIAL; that for Category III & IV sites requires a marking of at least RESTRICTED)</i></p>
<p>0105 The types and locations of intruder detection system (IDS) sensors and the associated CCTV cameras, including circuit diagrams and cable runs, and the maintenance and testing programmes for these equipments</p>	<p>Not Releasable</p>	<p>Any details which could assist in the security systems at nuclear facilities being defeated by an attacker must be protected. FOI section 31(1)(a) may apply.</p> <p><i>(This information merits a P-M of CONFIDENTIAL for Categories I and II and RESTRICTED for Categories III and IV)</i></p>
<p>0106 Details of Automatic Access Control Systems (AACS), including the location of computer servers and back-up servers.</p>	<p>Not Releasable</p>	<p>Any details that could lead to the AACS system being defeated by an attacker, insider or outsider, should not be released.</p> <p><i>(Such information requires a P-M of CONFIDENTIAL for Categories I, II and Vital Areas and RESTRICTED for Categories III and IV)</i></p>
<p>0107 Stores: security procedures for the issue, receipt and control of stock; names of authorised key holders; arrangements for monitoring and guarding:</p>	<p>Not Releasable</p>	<p>Of great potential assistance to attackers (whether they be insiders or outsiders) who may be considering sabotage or theft of nuclear material.</p> <p><i>(Information of this nature for Category I facilities attracts a P-M of up to CONFIDENTIAL)</i></p>

Topic	Sensitivity	Reason for Protecting
0108 General maps showing the position and limits of a nuclear facility but without detail of what is contained therein	Releasable	None <i>The Nuclear Installations Act 1965 requires the Minister to maintain a list of licensed sites and maps showing position and limits and to ensure the list is available to the public. This information does NOT attract a protective marking.</i>
0200 Information Relating to the Quantity and Form of Nuclear Material		
0201 Information about the quantity and form of nuclear material received or held in specified locations relating solely to civil nuclear programmes: a. All Categories of site and NPS b. Exact locations where spent fuel is held c. List of spent fuel management facilities	Not Releasable Not Releasable Releasable	Information of the sort contained in this section could be an aid to choosing targets while planning attacks. <i>(Information on sub-paras a and b normally attract a marking of RESTRICTED)</i> None
0202 Throughput – nominal capacity, actual throughput and historical data on throughput of a plant under Safeguards	Releasable	None
0300 Nuclear Material in Transit (Including Movements within Sites)		
0301 Information on Category I - III movements	Not Releasable	Information of this sort would be an aid to choosing targets while planning attacks for theft or sabotage on material in transit. <i>(information on Category I movements merits a marking of CONFIDENTIAL that of Category II and III movements a marking of RESTRICTED)</i>
0302 Information on Category IV movements	Releasable with discretion	Information of this sort could be an aid in planning theft or sabotage attacks so information should be treated with care <i>(does NOT normally attract a protective marking)</i>

Topic	Sensitivity	Reason for Protecting
<p>0303 High Security Vehicles (HSV)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Visual access to interior of cab and cargo compartment b. Physical security features of vehicle design and construction c. Design and function of alarms, immobilisation devices and key designs for special locks d. Load compartment keys, spare keys and combination lock settings, where used 	<p>Not Releasable</p> <p>Not Releasable</p> <p>Not Releasable</p> <p>Not Releasable</p>	<p>HSV carry fissile material and any information of the type listed in this section would be of use to an attacker planning an attempt to steal or sabotage fissile material in transit.</p> <p><i>(The appropriate P-M for the various aspects opposite would be:</i> <i>a. RESTRICTED</i> <i>b and c. CONFIDENTIAL</i> <i>d. SECRET)</i></p>
<p>0304 Vehicle tracking system; performance and communications</p>	<p>Not Releasable</p>	<p>HSV carry fissile material and any information of the type listed in this section would be of use to an attacker planning an attempt steal or sabotage fissile material in transit.</p> <p><i>(Detail of this nature would require a P-M of at least RESTRICTED)</i></p>
<p>0305 Nuclear Material Transit Containers:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Level of resistance of transport containers of containers to attack by various means b. Specifications and design data on containers 	<p>Not Releasable</p> <p>Releasable</p>	<p>Useful to an attacker planning a sabotage attack with the aim of releasing radioactive material, or theft of the material.</p> <p><i>(This data is covered by the protective marking of CONFIDENTIAL)</i></p>
<p>0400 IT Systems & Computer Systems Important to Security and Safety</p>		
<p>0401 Details of IT Systems storing and processing RESTRICTED information, the architecture of the systems and details of security measures employed and where back-up data is stored</p>	<p>Not Releasable</p>	<p>Useful information for a person or group planning theft, sabotage or other malevolent act at a nuclear facility.</p> <p><i>(Details of such systems would require a P-M of RESTRICTED)</i></p>
<p>0402 Details of computer systems which perform access control for entry to and egress from a licensed nuclear site and to other facilities within the site and other security functions; and information on the location of back-up hardware and software</p>	<p>Not Releasable</p>	<p>Information useful to a person or group planning theft, sabotage or other malevolent act at a nuclear facility.</p> <p><i>(Detail of this nature would require a P-M of at least RESTRICTED)</i></p>

Topic	Sensitivity	Reason for Protecting
0403 Fact that systems controlling access may also have a safety mustering function	Releasable	
<p>0404 Details of computer based systems important to safety installed on licensed nuclear sites, including the locations, functions and upgrade routes for the systems and where back-up information is stored (SC = safety category):</p> <p>a. SC 1 systems</p> <p>b. SC 2 & 3 systems</p>	<p>Not Releasable</p> <p>Not Releasable</p>	<p>Compromise of these systems could permit an attacker to at least disrupt the operations of a facility. In the worst case disruption could lead to a radioactive release.</p> <p><i>(Details of such systems would require a P-M of CONFIDENTIAL)</i></p> <p><i>(Details of such systems would require a P-M of RESTRICTED)</i></p>
0500 Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC)		
<p>0501 The Civil Nuclear Police Authority</p> <p>a. Composition and appointments</p> <p>b. Periodic general reports</p>	<p>Releasable</p> <p>Releasable</p>	
<p>0502 The Constabulary</p> <p>a. Overall establishment and the current strength of the force</p> <p>b. Establishment and current strength at particular sites</p> <p>c. Numbers on any shift at a site</p> <p>d. Number of authorised firearms officers at individual sites</p> <p>e. Armed response capabilities and timings at a site</p>	<p>Releasable</p> <p>Not Releasable</p> <p>Not Releasable</p> <p>Not Releasable</p> <p>Not Releasable</p>	<p>Available in CC's Annual Report</p> <p>Information of this nature would be very useful to any individual or group in planning an incursion into a nuclear site for the purpose of sabotage or theft and would seriously undermine the capability for effective response to an attack.</p> <p><i>(Details of this nature would require a P-M of at least RESTRICTED)</i></p> <p>Any information that would help a terrorist group to estimate in advance the scale of response and the capabilities available in a CNC operational unit must be protected from disclosure.</p> <p><i>(Details of such systems would require a P-M of CONFIDENTIAL)</i></p>

Topic	Sensitivity	Reason for Protecting
<p>0503 CNC escorts for movements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. That escorting CNC officers may be armed b. Deployment and strength of escorts c. Radio frequencies in use to enable communication with County or Regional Police Forces 	<p>Releasable</p> <p>Not Releasable</p> <p>Not Releasable</p>	<p>Information of the nature contained in sub-paragraphs b and c would be of great use to an individual or group planning to attack a convoy</p> <p><i>(Details of this nature would require a P-M of RESTRICTED)</i></p>
<p>0600 Nuclear Material Accounting</p>		
<p>0601 Description</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Statements of general material accounting principles b. Description and location of Material Balance Areas (MBA) and Key Measurement Points (KMP) not already in the public domain c. Physical and chemical form of material measurement at KMP 	<p>Releasable</p> <p>Not Releasable</p> <p>Not Releasable</p>	<p>Reveals details of location and quantities of fissile material that would be of use to an attacker planning theft of nuclear material or sabotage.</p> <p><i>(Details of this nature would attract a P-M of RESTRICTED)</i></p>
<p>0602 Measurements and instrumentation data:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Data which reveals the sensitivity of measurement or the alarm limits for MUF at a particular plant b. Precision and accuracy of standard laboratory techniques 	<p>Not Releasable</p> <p>Releasable</p>	<p>Some precision and accuracy data relating to actual or typical measurements at sites, whether aggregated or disaggregated, could assist terrorists or others planning theft of material</p> <p><i>(Details of this nature require a P-M of RESTRICTED)</i></p>
<p>0603 Nuclear material flow and inventory data</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Nuclear material flow and inventory data held on IT systems, in hard copy or on any form of storage medium. 	<p>Not Releasable</p>	<p>Information of this nature could reveal exact details of the location and movements of nuclear materials</p>

Topic	Sensitivity	Reason for Protecting
b. Inventory information in other records, if locations are referred to by code numbers and the key to the code is marked RESTRICTED	Releasable	<i>(Details of this nature would require a P-M of RESTRICTED)</i>
<p>0604 Material Unaccounted For (MUF)</p> <p>a. Annual MUF figures for a site which do not reveal the MBA concerned</p> <p>b. MUF in MBAs or KMPs</p> <p>d. Details of investigations into particular MUFs unless formally approved for release</p> <p>e. Limit of Error for MUF (LEMUF) or other specific indications of the uncertainty of MUF figures</p>	<p>Releasable</p> <p>Not Releasable</p> <p>Not Releasable</p> <p>Not Releasable</p>	<p>Following DTI's formal approval the companies in the civil nuclear industry publish annually an overall MUF figure for each of their sites for safeguarded plutonium, high enriched, low enriched, natural and depleted uranium. Provided that protectively marked or commercial information is not disclosed, questions arising from the publication of MUF figures can be answered. It is not intended that MUF data should be withheld solely on the grounds that it would cause embarrassment to the companies <i>(Details of this nature may attract a P-M of RESTRICTED or higher)</i></p>
0700 Planning Applications		
<p>0701 Planning applications should contain only the minimum information required by law:</p> <p>a. Plans and drawings should contain only the detail necessary and must not indicate location of security equipment</p> <p>b. Detailed description of the function of the building is to be avoided although building numbers may be used</p> <p>c. Fence lines may be indicated but detail of the fence structure should be avoided</p>	Releasable (with discretion)	<p>If it becomes necessary to provide the planning authority with more than the basic information, this information should be contained in an annex and protectively marked appropriately.</p> <p>The planning authorities should be notified that is to be protected and is not for public consumption. Attention of the planners should be drawn to Section 79 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.</p> <p>Operators should consult the appropriate local authorities and apprise them of the sensitivity of any information in the application which requires protection and that it should not be available for public scrutiny <i>(some information that is attached to</i></p>

Topic	Sensitivity	Reason for Protecting
		<i>an application may attract a P-M of at least RESTRICTED)</i>
0800 Safety Cases and Other Safety or Environmental Information		
<p>0801 Safety Cases</p> <p>a. Safety cases of all classes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • details of the potential hazards or other information that could be used as a surrogate for evaluating the impact of a release, or details on the impacts of releases; • details of strengths and weaknesses of processes, structures and protection systems designed to contain, control or secure material; • details of essential services which underpin systems and structures designed to contain, control or secure material; • details of access to the production process, both physical access control and removal of material from the process for control and monitoring purposes. <p><i>(note: any safety case which contains information included elsewhere in this Guide must take account of the sensitivity of that information)</i></p> <p>b. Safety case summaries</p>	<p>Not Releasable</p> <p>Not Releasable</p> <p>Not Releasable</p> <p>Not Releasable</p> <p>Releasable</p>	<p>The type of detailed information contained in safety cases would be of great use as an aid to a potential attacker for choosing targets and planning an operation.</p> <p><i>(all of the information detailed in the bulleted list attracts a protective marking of at least RESTRICTED)</i></p> <p><i>For Safety Category (SC) 3 there may be no summary; the SC3 Log will substitute</i></p>
0900 Contingency and Emergency Plans & Exercises		
<p>0901 Contingency and emergency plans</p> <p>Existence of and details in Contingency and</p>	<p>Releasable</p>	

Topic	Sensitivity	Reason for Protecting
Emergency plans for a radiological incident at a facility		
<p>0902 Security Contingency Plans</p> <p>Detail in security contingency plans for a nuclear facility</p>	Not Releasable	<p>Such plans contain detailed information on the security regimes and procedures in place. They would also contain information on the capabilities of the police or guard force contingents and on the likely response to a security incident. All would be very useful to a would-be attacker. FOI section 31(1)(a) may apply.</p> <p><i>(Details of this nature would require a P-M of at least RESTRICTED)</i></p>
<p>0903 Exercises</p> <p>a. That an exercise is to take, or has taken place</p> <p>b. Details of security exercises at a facility</p> <p>c. Details of safety exercises</p>	<p>Releasable</p> <p>Not Releasable</p> <p>Releasable (with discretion)</p>	<p>Provides would-be attackers with information concerning nature and timing of response, detail of armed response force, nature of tactics employed and signal plan</p> <p><i>(Depending on the nature of the exercise, a P-M of RESTRICTED or CONFIDENTIAL may apply)</i></p> <p>Information concerning the location and contents of buildings at a facility of particular sensitivity should not, however, be released, as it would provide a potential attacker with useful planning information</p>
1000 Personal Information		
<p>1001 Personal information</p> <p>a. Information in vetting files</p> <p>b. Information in personal files</p>	<p>Not Releasable</p> <p>Not Releasable</p>	<p>Information of this nature could be used by a potential attacker to attempt to suborn or otherwise exert pressure on an individual working at a facility or on an individual associated with a facility.</p> <p><i>(Protection for this type of information is afforded by vetting confidentiality)</i></p>

Topic	Sensitivity	Reason for Protecting
<p>1202 Waste from decommissioning</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. That a store is to be built and location b. Detail of the construction, security measures and quantity of material to be stored in new builds for the treatment and storage of waste and arisings c. Details in contracts concerning security of waste streams, routes, storage d. Details of quantity, type and location of waste and arisings stored 	<p>Releasable</p> <p>Not Releasable</p> <p>Not Releasable</p> <p>Not Releasable</p>	<p>Provides good targeting information for an attacker planning sabotage attacks. <i>(Details of this nature would require a P-M of RESTRICTED)</i></p> <p>Would provide advance targeting information to a person or group intending to attack a facility. <i>(could attract a P-M of up to CONFIDENTIAL)</i></p>
<p>1300 Historical Information</p>		
<p>1301 Historical information, not already in the public domain, that contains information currently relevant and still sensitive (in relation to the other sections in this document), whether or not a protective marking has been applied.</p>	<p>Not Releasable</p>	<p>Information of this nature, although old, may still be of use to malevolent persons planning action against a facility. <i>(Could be protectively marked up to and including SECRET)</i></p> <p><i>Operators should review their historical data to ascertain what might fall into this category</i></p>
<p>1400 Threat Assessments and Security Alerting Information</p>		
<p>1401 Annual threat assessments issued by OCNS</p>	<p>Not Releasable</p>	<p>Exempt under FOI section 23(1) <i>(Protectively marked up to and including SECRET)</i></p>
<p>1402 Design Basis Threat</p>	<p>Not Releasable</p>	<p>Exempt under FOI section 23(1) <i>(Protectively marked up to and including SECRET)</i></p>
<p>1403 Reasons for Alert State in place and for changes in Alert States</p>	<p>Not Releasable</p>	<p>Exempt under FOI section 23(1) <i>(Protectively marked up to and including SECRET)</i></p>

Annex A

LEGISLATION ON DISCLOSURE

The access provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 come into force on 1 January 2005 and create a statutory right of access to information held by a Public Authority and provide a scheme for making information available. The Acts cover a wide range of public authorities and include public companies (see section 6 and Schedule 1); included are central government, local government, NHS bodies, schools, colleges, the police; other public bodies and offices. UKAEA is a public authority under Schedule 1 Part VI and BNFL another, under section 6 of both the FOI Acts. Section 6 does not appear to apply to other companies in the civil nuclear industry, although each should review its position thereunder. Section 4(1) of both Acts, however, provides that the Secretary of State (or Scottish Minister) may, if certain conditions are met, add to the schedule. The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) is likely to be one such addition.

Regulated by a Commissioner to whom the public have direct access, the FOI Act permits people to apply for access to information only. Whilst providing such right of access, the Acts also create exemptions from the duty to disclose and establishes the arrangements for enforcement and appeal. The Act also requires public authorities to inform the individual who requested it the basis for refusing a request for information, which must be made on the basis of the exemptions in the Acts.

Information may be withheld legitimately under the FOI Acts where an exemption applies or a public interest test is satisfied. Simply because information attracts a protective marking does not mean that it cannot be disclosed. In reality, however, if information has been protectively marked appropriately it is highly likely that the 'public interest' considerations that the Acts require have been taken into account and that the information may be withheld.

Environmental legislation provides for the placing of information relating to activities under various regulatory regimes on public registers. In most cases the Secretary of State has the power to direct that information should be withheld on the grounds of national security. In addition, the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 require the provision of "environmental information" by certain public bodies upon request. This requirement is subject to certain exceptions, notably where disclosure would affect international relations, national defence or public security.

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACTS

Part 2 of both the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 detail information that is exempt from disclosure, without being subject to a public interest test. The relevant Sections in each Act are, however, not always the same. When in this document there is a reference to a Section of the Freedom of Information Act the reference is from the FOI Act 2000. The comparison table and notes below enable cross-reference between the two Acts.

Aspect	FOI Act 2000 Section No	Scottish Act 2002 Section No
National Security	24	Both 31
Defence	26	
International Relations	27	32
Economy	29	Both 33
Commercial interests	43	
Public authority investigations	30	34
Law enforcement	31	35
Effective conduct of public affairs	36	30
Health and Safety	38	Both 39
Environmental	39	
Personal information	40	38
Information provided in confidence	42	36
Disclosure of environmental information	74	62
Removing restrictions on disclosure	75	64

General Points

Where the FOI Act 2000 defines exempt information as that which “would, or would be likely to, prejudice”, the Scottish Act states “prejudice substantially”.

The FOI Act 2000 has “The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or extent to which compliance with section”. The Scottish Act does not have this provision.

In the Scottish Act “Scottish Ministers” replaces the “Secretary of State” throughout.

National Security and Defence

Whereas the FOI Act 2000 requires a Minister of the Crown to certify information is exempt, the Scottish Act requires a Member of the Scottish Executive to do so.

Public Authority Investigations/Law Enforcement

The differences between these sections in the FOI Act 2000 and in the Scottish Act are to take account of Scottish law and associated terminology.

Effective Conduct of Public Affairs

The FOI Act 2000 has the requirement for judgements to be made “in the reasonable opinion of a qualified person”, the Scottish Act does not contain this provision.

Information Provided in Confidence

S36(1) of the Scottish Act – Information in respect of which a claim to confidentiality of communications could be maintained in legal proceedings is exempt information – this is not reflected in S41 of the FOI Act 2000.

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Annex B

DEFINITIONS OF PROTECTIVE MARKINGS

SECRET (S) The compromise of SECRET information or material would be likely:

- to raise international tension; to damage seriously relations with friendly governments;
- to threaten life directly, or seriously prejudice public order, or individual security or liberty;
- to cause serious damage to the operational effectiveness or security of the UK or allied forces or the continuing effectiveness of highly valuable security or intelligence operations;
- to cause substantial material damage to national finances or economic and commercial interests.
- *to be of exceptional use to an individual or group planning a malevolent act against a nuclear facility or material transport*

CONFIDENTIAL (C) The compromise of CONFIDENTIAL information or material would be likely:

- to materially damage diplomatic relations (ie cause formal protest or other sanctions);
- to prejudice individual security or liberty;
- to cause damage to the operational effectiveness or security of UK or allied forces or the effectiveness of valuable security or intelligence operations;
- to work substantially against national finances or economic and commercial interests;
- substantially to undermine the financial viability or major organisations;
- to impede the investigation or facilitate the commission of serious crime;
- to impede seriously the development or operation of a major government policies;
- to shut down or otherwise substantially disrupt significant national operations.
- *to be of substantial use to an individual or group planning a malevolent act against a nuclear facility or material transport*

RESTRICTED (R) The compromise of RESTRICTED information or material would be likely:

- to affect diplomatic relations adversely;
- to cause substantial distress to individuals;
- to make it more difficult to maintain the operational effectiveness or security of UK or allied forces;
- to cause financial loss or loss of earnings potential to or facilitate improper gain or advantage for individuals or companies;
- to prejudice the investigation of crime;
- to facilitate the commission of crime;
- to breach proper undertakings to maintain the confidence of information provided by third parties;
- to impede the effective development or operation of government policies;
- to breach statutory restrictions on disclosure of information;
- to disadvantage government in commercial or policy negotiations with others;
- to undermine the proper management of the public sector and its operations.
- *to be of significant use to an individual or group planning a malevolent act against a nuclear facility or material transport*

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Annex C

CATEGORIES OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

MATERIAL	CATEGORIES	
	I/II	III
1. Plutonium (other than plutonium with an isotopic concentration exceeding 80% in plutonium-238) which is not irradiated	More than 500 grammes	500 grammes or less, but more than 15 grammes
2. Uranium-233 which is not irradiated	More than 500 grammes	500 grammes or less, but more than 15 grammes
3. Previously separated Neptunium-237 which is not irradiated	More than 1 kilogramme	1 kilogramme or less, but more than 15 grammes
4. Previously separated americium-241, previously separated americium-242m or previously separated americium-243, which are not irradiated	More than 1 kilogramme	1 kilogramme or less, but more than 15 grammes
5. Uranium-235 in enriched uranium containing 20% or more of uranium-235, which is not irradiated	More than 1 kilogramme	1 kilogramme or less, but more than 15 grammes
6. Uranium-235 in enriched uranium containing 10% or more, but less than 20% of uranium-235, which is not irradiated	10 kilogrammes or more	Less than 10 kilogrammes, but more than 1 kilogramme
7. Uranium-235 in enriched uranium containing less than 10% but more than 0.711% of uranium-235, which is not irradiated		10 kilogrammes or more
8. Irradiated reactor fuel being used, stored or transported within the United Kingdom		Any quantity
9. Irradiated reactor fuel being transported outside the United Kingdom, other than such fuel which, prior to being irradiated, was uranium enriched so as to contain 10% or more, but less than 20% of uranium-235	Any quantity	
10. Irradiated reactor fuel being transported outside the United Kingdom which, prior to being irradiated, was uranium enriched so as to contain 10% or more, but less than 20% of uranium-235		Any quantity
11. Other irradiated nuclear material		Any quantity

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Annex D

GLOSSARY

The following abbreviations are used within this document:

AACS	Automatic Access Control System
ATC&S	Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
BE	British Energy
BEGL	British Energy Generation Ltd
BEG(UK)L	British Energy Generation (UK) Ltd
BNFL	British Nuclear Fuels
BRIMS	British Radwaste information Management System
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CNC	Civil Nuclear Constabulary
DCNS	Director of Civil Nuclear Security
ETUK	Enrichment Technology UK Ltd
FOI	Freedom Of Information Act 2000
FOI(S)	Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002
HSV	High Security Vehicles
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IDS	Intruder Detection System
KMP	Key Measurement Points
LEMUF	Limit of Error for MUF
LMU	Liabilities Management Unit
MBA	Material Balance Area
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MUF	Material Unaccounted For
NDA	Nuclear Decommissioning Authority
NPS	Nuclear power stations
OCNS	Office for Civil Nuclear Security
ORM	Other Radioactive Material
PIDS	Perimeter Intruder Detection System
P-M	Protective Marking
SC	Safety Category
UCL	Urenco (Capenhurst) Ltd
UKAEA	United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority